Arrêt Volvo (2021) concludes that in multi-localized markets with collusive price fixing, the locus damni is:

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Multiple Choice

Arrêt Volvo (2021) concludes that in multi-localized markets with collusive price fixing, the locus damni is:

In cross-border cartel cases, the place where the damage is considered to occur (locus damni) is tied to where the injured party is connected and can most effectively pursue its claim. Arrêt Volvo (2021) clarifies that, for multi-localized markets affected by collusive price fixing, the locus damni is the victim’s registered office. The harm from price fixing touches the claimant’s economic interests across markets, but the legal link enabling the claim and the practical access to remedies is strongest at the claimant’s established place of business. This provides a stable, predictable basis for jurisdiction and avoids fragmenting the action across multiple jurisdictions. Why this fits best: the other locations either lack a direct, stable connection to the injury or would complicate enforcement. The market where prices were fixed doesn’t capture the full, cross-border harm and could lead to scattered suits. The defendant’s domicile is less connected to where the loss is realized by the claimant’s business operations. The central bank’s location has no bearing on civil damages for price fixing.

In cross-border cartel cases, the place where the damage is considered to occur (locus damni) is tied to where the injured party is connected and can most effectively pursue its claim. Arrêt Volvo (2021) clarifies that, for multi-localized markets affected by collusive price fixing, the locus damni is the victim’s registered office. The harm from price fixing touches the claimant’s economic interests across markets, but the legal link enabling the claim and the practical access to remedies is strongest at the claimant’s established place of business. This provides a stable, predictable basis for jurisdiction and avoids fragmenting the action across multiple jurisdictions.

Why this fits best: the other locations either lack a direct, stable connection to the injury or would complicate enforcement. The market where prices were fixed doesn’t capture the full, cross-border harm and could lead to scattered suits. The defendant’s domicile is less connected to where the loss is realized by the claimant’s business operations. The central bank’s location has no bearing on civil damages for price fixing.

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